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Dual Rate Control for Security in Cyber-physical Systems
Mohammad Naghnaeian, Nabil Hirzallah and Petros G. Voulgaris
Abstract—We consider malicious attacks on actuators and
sensors of a feedback system which can be modeled as additive,
possibly unbounded, disturbances at the digital (cyber) part
of the feedback loop. We precisely characterize the role of
the unstable poles and zeros of the system in the ability to
detect stealthy attacks in the context of the sampled data im-
plementation of the controller in feedback with the continuous
(physical) plant. We show that, if there is a single sensor that
is guaranteed to be secure and the plant is observable from
that sensor, then there exist a class of multirate sampled data
controllers that ensure that all attacks remain detectable. These
dual rate controllers are sampling the output faster than the
zero order hold rate that operates on the control input and as
such, they can even provide better nominal performance than
single rate, at the price of higher sampling of the continuous
output.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of cyber-physical systems has caught a lot of at-
tention lately. Recent papers along with successful attacks on
critical infrastructure together revealed many vulnerabilities
in the practiced methods of control. For instance, [1] showed
that if a hacker can access the cyber-space of the power grid,
then it is easy for him to change the power state estimates
without being detected by the traditional bad data detection
methods provided that he knows the grid configuration. This
led to many research papers investigating the security of
the state estimates and suggesting protective measures in
addition to investigating attacks on the actuators and/or the
plant itself. For example, [2], [3] introduce security indices
which quantify the minimum effort needed to change the
state estimates without triggering bad-data detectors with
perfect and imperfect knowledge of the system as constraints.
In [4] the authors considered attacks on control system
measurements that are not necessarily bounded or a follow
a certain distribution and without prior knowledge of the
system. They show that it is impossible to reconstruct the
states of the system if more than half of the sensors are
attacked, generalizing some earlier results in [5]. However,
an NP-hard problem has to be solved to detect the attacks. In
[6], [7], the authors inject a signal (unknown to the attacker)
into the system to detect replay attacks at the expense of
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increasing the cost of the LQG controller. However, if the
plant has an unstable zero then it can be shown that an
undetectable attack can still be designed. In [8], the authors
suggest the use of dynamic filters that continuously monitor
the states of the system at every instance of time. However,
the filters have a serious limitation in that they cannot detect
zero dynamics attacks. In [9], the authors investigate the class
of zero dynamics attacks and suggest adding extra sensors
or even perturbing the plant by adding extra connections to
remove the unstable zeros. However this may not always be
feasible in practice.
In this paper we focus on attacks on actuators and sensors,
represented as additive and unbounded disturbances on the
digital (i.e., “cyber”) part of the controlled system. We ex-
amine from an input-output perspective the exact conditions
under which such attacks can be stealthy, which brings up the
pivotal role of unstable zeros and poles of the open loop, con-
tinuous time, physical plant. A key point that the paper brings
is the sampled-data (SD) nature of a controlled cyberphysical
system which consists of the continuous physical dynamics
and the digital controller. The importance of the SD nature
lies in the fact that typically, to ensure good intersample
behavior, the rate of the sample and hold mechanism has to
be high enough. It is known however that high sampling rate
can lead to unstable zeros in the discrete plant dynamics.
In particular, even if a continuous LTI plant Pc has no
unstable zeros, its discrete representation Pd obtained by the
sampled and hold operations will introduce unstable zeros
if the relative degree of Pc is greater than three (e.g., [10])
and the sampling period T → 0 (see Figure 1.) Therefore,
a SD implementation of the controller may create additional
vulnerability to stealthy attacks and so, it is important to have
ways that secure the safety of the system while achieving the
required performance. As one such way, we propose a dual
rate sampling approach, a special case of multirate sampling
(MR), whereby the output is sampled at a multiple of the
hold rate.
Multirate sampling has been studied extensively in the
context of sampled-data control in the past and many relevant
analysis and synthesis results were obtained in the mid 80s
to mid 90s era (e.g., [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18] to mention only a few.) An interesting property of multi-
rate sampling is its ability to remove certain unstable zeros
of the discrete-time system when viewed in the lifted LTI
domain, which in turn allows for fulfilling certain potential
design requirements such as gain margin levels, or, strong
stabilization, that are not possible to satisfy with single rate.
It is precisely this property that we utilize and study in detail
in the context of stealthy attack detection. We show that dual
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Fig. 1. The standard SD system
rate control is sufficient to remove all the vulnerabilities to
stealthy actuator attacks. Of course, if all sensors are attached
as well then there is no way to detect attacks. On the other
hand, we show that if a single measurement output remains
secure, and if the modes of the system are observable from
this output, then dual rate systems always provide the ability
to detect combined sensor-actuator attacks.
Some standard notation we use is as follows: Z+, Rn,
Cn and Rn×m denote the sets of non-negative integers,
n-dimensional real vectors, n-dimensional complex vectors
and n ×m dimensional real matrices, respectively. For any
Rn or Cn vector x we denote x′ its transpose and |x| :=
maxi
√
x2i where x
′ = [x1, x2, ..., xn]; for a sequence of
real n-dimensional vectors, x = {x(k)}k∈Z+ we denote
||x|| := supk |x(k)|; for a sequence of real n×m dimensional
real matrices G = {Gk}k∈Z+ we denote its λ-transform
G(λ) :=
∑∞
k=0Gkλ
k. For a λ-transform x(λ) of a sequence
x of n-dimensional vectors ||x(λ)|| = ||x||.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the physical, continuous-time, LTI plant Pc =
[Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc] of Figure 1 that is controlled by a digital
controller K using the standard zero order hold and sampling
devices H and S respectively . In particular, in the absence
of any disturbances da and ds, the digital controller input
u = {u(k)} converts to the continuous time input uc(t) =
(Hu)(t) = u(k) for kT ≤ t < (k + 1)T where T is the
hold period, and the digital output y = {y(k)} sequence
is obtained by sampling the continuous time output yc with
the same period T , i.e., y(k) = (Syc)(k) = yc(kT ). The
corresponding discrete time LTI plant P is defined by the
relation y = Pu, i.e., P = SPcH, and has a description
P = [Ad, Bd, Cd, Dd] where the state space matrices are
obtained from the corresponding continuous time as
Ad := e
AcT ∈ Rn×n, Bd :=
∫ T
0
eAcτBcdτ ∈ Rn×nu ,
Cd := Cc ∈ Rny×n, Dd := Dc ∈ Rny×nu .
(1)
We assume that the employed realization of the continuous
plant Pc is minimal, which implies that the same holds
true for the discrete plant P in the absence of pathological
sampling (e.g., [10],) i.e., for almost all periods T .
Also in this figure, we consider the possibility of attacks
in terms of additive disturbances da and ds respectively at
the digital input u and at the output y of P . These attacks
on the digital part of the system can be on actuators only
(ds = 0), sensors only (da = 0), or on both, coordinated or
not. As they act on the cyber part of the system we allow
them to be unbounded sequences.
We assume that there is an attack detection mechanism in
place that monitors u and y and can detect an attack only if
the effect of da and/or ds on these signals is beyond a given
noise level threshold θ > 0, i.e., only if
∣∣∣∣[ yu
]
(k)
∣∣∣∣ > θ for
some k. Note that we implicitly assume that there are other
inputs such as noise, not shown in Fig 1, that have some
effect on u and y which is what relates to the nonzero noise
level θ. Accordingly, a stealthy attack will be the case when
the attack inputs da and/or ds can grow unbounded while
maintaining their effect on u and y below the detection limit.
Specifically, if d represents any of da or ds, then the attack is
stealthy if lim supk→∞ |d(k)| = ∞ while
∣∣∣∣[ yu
]
(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ
all k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In the sequel we consider various attack
scenarios and analyze the conditions of their detectability.
III. ACTUATOR ATTACKS
We start with the case when only actuator attacks da are
present (ds = 0) and proceed in characterizing their effect
on the monitoring vector
[
y
u
]
. Towards this end, let P
be factored as P = M˜−1N˜ = NM−1 where N˜ , M˜ and
N,M are left and right coprime respectively, and consider
the controller K with a similar coprime factorization as K =
X˜−1Y˜ = Y X−1. The mappings from da to y and u are
given respectively as (I − PK)−1P and K(I − PK)−1P .
Given that K stabilizes P , it holds that M˜X − N˜Y =: W
is a stable and stably invertible map (unit). Moreover, it can
be easily checked that[
y
u
]
=
[
X
Y
]
WN˜da. (2)
As X and Y are right coprime and W is a unit, it
follows that a stealthy attack is possible if and only if
N˜da is bounded for an unbounded da. That is, when
lim supk→∞ |da(k)| = ∞ it holds that
∥∥∥∥[ yu
]∥∥∥∥ < ∞ if
and only if
∥∥∥N˜da∥∥∥ < ∞. The following proposition is a
direct consequence of the previous analysis.
Proposition 1: Let P be a “tall” system, i.e., the number
of outputs is greater or equal to the number of inputs. Assume
further that P (λ) has no zero on the unit circle |λ| = 1.
Then, an (unbounded) actuator stealthy attack is possible if
and only if P (λ) has a non-minimum phase zero other than
at λ = 0, i.e., a zero for 0 < |λ| < 1.
Proof: Note that the unstable zeros of P are zeros of
N˜ . Assuming that P is SISO for simplicity with P (z0) = 0
where 0 < |z0| < 1, we have that N˜(z0) = 0 and
consequently any input da(k) = z0−k will lead via Equation
2 to
∥∥∥∥[ yu
]∥∥∥∥ < C0 where the constant C0 > 0 depends
on the closed loop maps. For example, C0 could be taken
as C0 =
∥∥∥∥∥
[
(I − P (λ)K(λ))−1P (λ) 11−(λ/z0)
K(λ)(I − P (λ)K(λ))−1P (λ) 11−(λ/z0)
]∥∥∥∥∥ .
Thus, if  is small enough, e.g., 0 <  < θC0 , the input
remains undetected. In the case where P is MIMO, the same
arguments apply for inputs of the form da(k) = d0z0−k
where d0 is the zero direction of z0 which can be chosen
with |d0| = 1 .
To prove the reverse, note that if P has no unstable zeros,
then the same holds for N˜ and thus
∥∥∥N˜da∥∥∥ < ∞ implies
that ‖da‖ <∞, so no stealth attacks are possible.
Remark 2: We remark here that if P has zeros on the
boundary |λ| = 1 with no multiplicity but no other unstable
zeros (other than at λ = 0,) then stealth attacks are not
possible. Indeed, if z0 is a simple zero with |z0| = 1, then the
corresponding input that can be masked (“zeroed out”) is of
the form da(k) = d0z0−k which is bounded with |da(k)| <
, and becomes undetected for small enough . But this case
is uninteresting, as the disturbance has a level of noise (which
can be taken care by any reasonably robust controller.) On
the other hand, if there are multiplicities, stealthy attacks
are possible. For example, if P is SISO and z0 = 1 is a
zero with multiplicity 2, then an unbounded input of the
form da(k) = k, k = 0, 1, . . . remains undetected for small
enough . More generally, in the MIMO case when a zero at
the boundary has multiplicity, one has to check the Smith-
McMillan form of P (λ) for invariant factors with multiplicity
corresponding to these zeros: stealthy attacks are possible if
and only if there are such factors.
Remark 3: When there is a zero of P at λ = 0 there is
no corresponding (causal) input signal to be “zeroed out.”
The case when P is “fat”, i.e. when the number of outputs
y is less than the number of inputs u, is always conducive
to stealthy attacks as one input can mask the effect of the
other. Indeed, consider a two input one output P = [P1 P2];
the effect of attacks at the individual control channels da1
and da2 on the output y is y = P1da1 + P2da2 + [P1 P2]u
and thus, picking for example, da2 = −P−12 P1da1 with da1
arbitrary and unbounded leads to y = [P1 P2]u, i.e. complete
masking of the attacks. 1
IV. SENSOR ATTACKS
The case of sensor only attack ds 6= 0, da = 0 can
be viewed in a similar spirit. In particular, by considering
coprime factorizations for P and K as before, the effect of
ds on the monitor vector is as[
y
u
]
=
[
(I − PK)−1
K(I − PK)−1
]
ds =
[
X
Y
]
WM˜ds. (3)
Therefore, using the same rationale as in the previous
case, we can claim that an attack is detectable if and only
if there are no ds with ‖ds‖ = ∞ and
∥∥∥M˜ds∥∥∥ < ∞. This
in turn means that attacks are detectable if and only if M˜
has no unstable zeros, which is equivalent that P is a stable
system. More specifically, we have the following which can
be proved as in the Proposition 1.
1Strictly speaking, P−12 may not exist if P2 is strictly proper , i.e., P2
has a zero at λ = 0; but one can always pick da1(λ) = λd¯a1(λ) with d¯a1
unbounded and make (P−12 P1da1)(λ) meaningful.
Fig. 2. A dual rate SD system
Proposition 4: Assume that P (λ) has no pole on the unit
circle |λ| = 1. Then, a sensor stealthy attack is possible if
and only if P (λ) has a pole with 0 < |λ| < 1, i.e., an
unstable pole other than λ = 0.
Regarding poles of P (λ) on the boundary |λ| = 1 similar
remarks hold as in the actuator attack case. Namely, if these
poles are simple then there is no stealthy attack. If they have
multiplicities, then their multiplicities in the corresponding
invariant factors in the Smith-McMillan form determine
whether stealthy attacks are possible.
V. COORDINATED ACTUATOR SENSOR ATTACKS
In the case when a coordination of actuator and sensor
attack is possible, stealthy attacks are always possible even
in the case where P is stable and minimum phase. Indeed,
in this case the effect of da can be completely masked by
canceling its effect at the output via ds: just pick ds = −Pda
with da arbitrary and unbounded, then y = Pu. Therefore,
unless there are outputs that are not attacked, this situation is
not of interest as there is no hope to detect the attack. If there
are such attack-free outputs, then the problem reverts to the
actuator only attack case, with these outputs used for analysis
and design. As a consequence, in the sequel we consider the
actuator only attack case where the secure sensor outputs are
assumed to provide an observable continuous time system
Pc.
VI. DUAL RATE CONTROL
In this paper, we focus on a particular MR scheme that
allows attacks to be detected by ensuring that there are no
relevant unstable zeros in the lifted system. This scheme
is simpler to the single rate one with periodic controller
obtained in the context of gain margin maximization in [19].
More specifically, we consider the SD scheme of Figure 2
(temporarily without any disturbances) where the output is
sampled with period T/m where m is a sufficiently large
integer, i.e., y(k) = (Smyc)(t) := yc(kT/m). A similar
scheme has been used in [11] in the context of strong
stabilization. Herein, we provide certain properties of the
unstable zeros of the lifted system that guarantee detectability
of actuator attacks.
To this end, let the corresponding discrete-time system
mapping u to y be
G = SmPcH.
For this MR discrete system we have that
ΛmG = GΛ
where Λ is the 1-step right shift operator on discrete se-
quences {x(k)}, i.e., (Λx)(k+1) = x(k) with (Λx)(0) = 0.
Using standard lifting techniques (e.g., [10]) one can obtain a
shift invariant (LTI) description G˜ of the discrete dynamics
by grouping the plant input and output signals as u˜(k) =
u(k) and y˜(k) = [y′c(kT/m) y
′
c((k+1)T/m) . . . y
′
c((k+m−
1)T/m)]′ (similarly for d˜a and d˜s.) A state space description
for G˜ can be obtained as follows:
Define state space matrices
A := eAcT/m ∈ Rn×n, B :=
∫ T/m
0
eAcτBcdτ ∈ Rn×nu ,
C := Cc ∈ Rny×n, D := Dc ∈ Rny×nu .
Then
G˜ =
[
A˜ B˜
C˜ D˜
]
, (4)
where
A˜ = Am ∈ Rn×n, B˜ =
m−1∑
k=0
AkB ∈ Rn×nu ,
C˜ =

C
CA
...
CAm−1
 ∈ Rmny×n,
D˜ =

D
CB +D
...
C
∑m−2
k=0 A
kB +D
 ∈ Rmny×nu .
Also, it becomes useful to define a discrete-time system
Pm :=
[
A B
C D
]
. This system corresponds to the single-
rate sampling and hold scheme of the original plant Pc with
a period of T/m, i.e., Pm = SmPcHm where Hm is accord-
ingly generating a continuous signal uc from the discrete u
as uc(t) = (Hmu)(t) = u(k) for kT/m ≤ t < (k+ 1)T/m.
It is clear that Pm has the same dimension as Pc, i.e. it
maps nu inputs to ny outputs. Moreover, given that Pc holds
a controllable and observable realization, and the sampling
is not pathological, it follows that the inherited realization
of Pm is also controllable and observable. Based on our
assumptions on the sampling, it is also easily verified that
the realization of G˜ as above is controllable and observable.
Let M˜G˜ and N˜G˜ be the left coprime factors of G˜. We will
use the state-space realization of N˜G˜ as
N˜G˜ =
[
A˜+HC˜ B˜ +HD˜
C˜ D˜
]
, (5)
where H is chosen such that A˜+HC˜ is Schur stable. It is
easy to show that G˜ and N˜G˜ have the same non-minimum
phase zeros. We consider now the closed loop in the lifted
domain in Figure 3 where the controller is K˜ and proceed
to argue that the lifted loop is not susceptible to stealthy
actuator attacks d˜a, and thus the original MR loop of Figure 2
Fig. 3. The lifted system
is not susceptible either. To this end, the integer m is chosen
such that the following assumptions are satisfied.
Assumption 5: The matrix B is full column rank.
Assumption 6: The matrix O : =

C
CA
...
CAm−2
 is full
column rank.
The first assumption is standard and holds generically if
Bc is full column rank in the continuous system. The second
assumption holds for large enough m, in particular m =
n+ 1, if the pair (A,C) is observable, which is true as Pm
is minimal. It can also hold however, even with a small m
generically. Also, if Assumption 6 holds, G˜ is a tall system.
Then the following lemma characterizes the zeros of G˜.
Lemma 7: Consider the lifted system G˜ as in (4) together
with Assumptions (5) and (6). Then G˜ has at most one non-
minimum zero and is located at λ = 1.
Proof: Since N˜G˜ and G˜ have the same non-minimum
phase zeros, we will prove this lemma for N˜G˜. Notice that
since N˜G˜ is tall, |λ0| ≤ 1 is a zero if and only if there exists
a vector ν ∈ Rnu such that
N˜G˜ (λ0) ν =[
λ0C˜
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν = 0.
Notice that
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1
is well-defined as all the
eigenvalues of A˜ + HC˜ are inside the unit circle. Now,
let ξ =
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν. Then, pre-
multiplying by
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]
and using λ0C˜ξ +
D˜ν = 0, we get
λ0C˜ξ + D˜ν = 0, (6)(
I − λ0A˜
)
ξ − B˜ν = 0. (7)
Pre-multiplying (6) by X , where X is a matrix X ∈
R(m−1)ny×mny given as
X =

I −I 0 · · · 0
0 I −I
...
. . . . . .
0 · · · 0 I −I
 . (8)
we get
λ0XC˜ξ +XD˜ν = O [λ0 (I −A) ξ −Bν] = 0.
Since O is full column rank by Assumption 6, it holds true
that
λ0 (A− I) ξ +Bν = 0,
which together with (7) gives[(
I − λ0A˜
)
B + λ0 (A− I) B˜
]
ν = 0.
Simplifying further yields
(1− λ0)Bν = 0.
Therefore, if ν is nonzero then λ0 = 1 since, by Assumption
5, B is full column rank.
According to Lemma 7, the lifted system, G˜, has no zeros
inside the unit circle. However, it may have a zero at λ =
1. Based on Proposition 1 and Remark 2, an (unbounded)
actuator stealthy attack will not possible if λ = 1 is zero of
G˜ with multiplicity of at most one. Indeed, this is the case
as it is proved in the following theorem:
Theorem 8: Consider the dual rate SD scheme as in
Figure 3. Then, there does not exist any (unbounded) actuator
stealthy attack if Assumptions 5 and 6 are met.
Proof: As discussed before, we need to show that λ = 1
is a zero of G˜ or equivalently N˜G˜ with the multiplicity of at
most one. It can be argued that ([20]-Section 6.5) λ = 1 is
a zero of algebraic multiplicity greater than one if and only
if the matrix T :=
[
N˜G˜ (1) 0
d
dλN˜G˜ (λ) |λ=1 N˜G˜ (1)
]
has a right
null chain; that is, there exists a vector ν =
[
ν1
ν2
]
, with
ν1 6= 0, such that Tν = 0. By the way of contradiction, we
will show that if Tν = 0 then ν1 = 0. Direct calculations
show that if Tν = 0 then[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν1 = 0, (9)
[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−2 (
B˜ +HD˜
)]
ν1
+
[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν2 = 0.
(10)
Define,
ξ1 =
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν1,
ξ2 =
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 [
ξ1 +
(
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν2
]
.
Pre-multiplying ξ1 and ξ2 by
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]
and group-
ing terms we get(
I − A˜
)
ξ1 − B˜ν1 = H
(
C˜ξ1 + D˜ν1
)
, (11)
−ξ1 +
(
I − A˜
)
ξ2 − B˜ν2 = H
(
C˜ξ2 + D˜ν2
)
. (12)
From (9)-(12),
C˜ξ1 + D˜ν1 = 0, (13)
C˜ξ2 + D˜ν2 = 0, (14)(
I − A˜
)
ξ1 − B˜ν1 = 0, (15)
−ξ1 +
(
I − A˜
)
ξ2 − B˜ν2 = 0. (16)
Furthermore, pre-multiplying (13) and (14) gives
XC˜ξ1 +XD˜ν1 = O [(I −A) ξ1 −Bν1] = 0,
XC˜ξ2 +XD˜ν2 = O [(I −A) ξ2 −Bν2] = 0,
where X is as in (8), which in turn imply
(I −A) ξ1 −Bν1 = 0, (17)
(I −A) ξ2 −Bν2 = 0. (18)
Eliminating ξ2 between (16) and (18), we get
− (I −A) ξ1 −
[
(I −A) B˜ −
(
I − A˜
)
B
]
ν2 = 0.
Notice that (I −A) B˜ −
(
I − A˜
)
B = 0 and hence the last
equation implies
(I −A) ξ1 = 0
which in turn, together with (17), implies Bν1 = 0. By
Assumption 5, Bν1 = 0 implies ν1 = 0 and this completes
the proof.
As a final comment from the previous analysis, we offer
conditions when G˜ has a zero λ = 1. We note that, as proved
in the previous theorem, these zeros are not a problem since
they cannot generate stealthy attacks.
Proposition 9: Let Pc be “tall.” Then G˜ has a zero at
λ = 1 if and only if Pm does.
Proof: Suppose G˜ has a zero at λ = 1. Then, there
exist vectors ξ and ν, at least one of them nonzero, such
that (6) and (7) hold for λ0 = 1. In particular, from (6) we
get
Cξ +Dν = 0. (19)
Furthermore, pre-multiplying (6) by X results in
O [(I −A) ξ −Bν] = 0 which in turn implies
(I −A) ξ −Bν = 0. (20)
(19) and (20) imply that Pm has a zero at λ = 1.
Conversely, if Pm has a zero at λ = 1,[
I −A −B
C D
] [
ξ
ν
]
= 0, (21)
for some ξ and ν. Pre-multiplying it by
∑m−1
k=1 A
k 0
0 I
−C I
−C − CA I
...
−C∑m−2k=0 Ak I

(22)
gives
[
I − A˜ −B˜
C˜ D˜
] [
ξ
ν
]
= 0. That is, G˜ has a zero at
λ = 1.
Proposition 10: Let Pc be “fat.” Then G˜ has always a zero
at λ = 1.
Proof: The proof relies on the fact that since Pc or
equivalently Pm is fat, there always exist two vectors ξ and
ν with at least one of them nonzero such that (21) holds.
Then, the rest of the proof follows similarly to that of the
converse part of Proposition 9.
Remark 11: We would like to point out that an equivalent
way of obtaining the same results, i.e., ability to detect
zero attacks, is to hold the control input longer rather than
sampling the output faster. That is, if we consider a dual
rate system where the hold operates with a period of mT
while the output is sampled with T , then the corresponding
lifted system will enjoy the same properties as before in
terms of unstable zeros. Obviously, the (nominal) controller
performance will be reduced as the control is slower. On
the other hand, there is a potential benefit of lower cost of
actuation in this case.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a simple dual rate sampled data scheme
which guarantees detectability of actuator and/or sensor
attacks, if a secure output that maintains observability of
the open loop modes is available. The main observation
is that the sampled data nature in the implementation of
the cybephysical system cannot be ignored as sampling can
generate additional vulnerabilities due to the extra unstable
zeros it may introduce, particularly if high rates are necessary
to achieve certain performance level. The proposed method
takes care of this issue by the use of multirate sampling
that ensures that zeros exist only in harmless locations in
the lifted domain. We gave certain precise conditions on the
detectability of stealthy attacks in terms of the open loop
unstable poles and zeros and showed how the vulnerabilities
can be eradicated by the use of the dual rate scheme.
Several other possibilities can be studied in this context.
The use of asynchronous sampling (e.g., [23], [24]) can
provide alternative ways to detect stealthy attacks; or even
the network’s random delays can be helpful in that respect;
the speed of detecting however needs to be brought into
consideration, even if the attack is detectable. The methods of
generalized holds [25] are also relevant as they move zeros,
and with careful analysis of their robustness properties (e.g.,
[26], [27]) can provide acceptable and simple solutions as
well. All of these are subjects of current investigations by
the authors and are documented in forthcoming publications.
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